We estimate the effect of publicly disseminated information about school-level achievement on students' mobility between elementary schools. We find that students are more likely to leave their school when poor school-level performance is revealed. In general, parents respond to information soon after it becomes available. Once the information is absorbed, they do not respond to subsequent releases, even when it is reframed and given widespread media attention. Parents in low-income neighborhoods and who speak a non-English language at home respond most strongly. However, non-English speaking parents only respond when information is widely disseminated and discussed in the media.
Introduction
Economists have long argued that policies that increase competition in markets for education can improve educational outcomes by increasing disadvantaged students' access to high quality schools, and by causing underperforming schools to become more effective or to shrink as families "vote with their feet" (Friedman 1955; Becker 1995; Hoxby 2003) . These ideas have become increasingly popular, and many jurisdictions now offer parents alternatives to neighborhood public schools, and often provide parents with information about school quality.
Recent evidence shows that directly providing parents with information about school-level achievement can influence school choice (Hastings and Weinstein 2008) . However, whether publicly disseminating school achievement measures through the media has the same effect remains unknown. 2 On the one hand, widespread dissemination may substantially increase the effectiveness of school choice policies, because it has the potential to influence the choices of many parents. However, a large increase in the demand for high-achieving schools will not increase competitive pressure on weaker schools unless preferred schools can actually accommodate more students. Furthermore, children whose parents have poor access to media, or who are not part of well-informed social networks, may not benefit from public information strategies. Parents could also be misled or confused when education authorities update public information if these measures are subject to substantial sampling variation.
Our study addresses these issues by examining the effect of public information about school achievement on school choice behavior in British Columbia (B.C.). Our estimates are based on student-level longitudinal data on multiple cohorts of students that span the introduction of standardized testing and the subsequent wide dissemination of school-level results. We use a difference-in-difference framework to measure the effect of new information on the probability that public school students move to a different school following Grade 4. We also investigate whether the response to information about school performance differs among parents who may face higher costs of accessing the information.
School-level achievement measures are likely to be highly correlated with unmeasured characteristics of schools that influence parents' beliefs about school quality and affect student mobility. Our strategy to identify the response to new information takes advantage of the timing of testing and the release of test results; parents do not receive information about the exam results of their own child's cohort in the year they take the exams. In the year that students are tested, therefore, the current cohort's exam results are a valid control for unmeasured characteristics that jointly determine mobility and school-level achievement, and new information about the achievement of previous cohorts is a conditionally exogenous shock to parent's information about school quality.
We find that the public release of information about school-level achievement has a substantial effect on the inter-school mobility of students attending public schools. In general, students are more likely to leave their school when they learn that their schoolmates have performed relatively poorly. Families that speak English at home, particularly those who reside in lowincome neighborhoods, respond strongly to early information releases. Once they have absorbed this information, however, they do not respond to subsequent releases. Those who speak a language other than English at home only respond when the information is reframed and given widespread media attention, but their response is large. Arguably, non-English speakers and residents of low-income neighborhoods had the worst private information about school quality before public information became available, and hence valued the new information most. The delayed response of non-English speakers suggests they face high costs of accessing public information.
Previous literature
A number of studies examine the introduction of new forms of information about school quality in environments where school-level achievement measures are already in the public domain. Figlio and Lucas (2004) and Fiva and Kirkebøen (2008) show that newly-framed measures of school quality affect real estate prices, even when a substantial amount of information is already publicly available. Kane et al. (2003) find that real estate prices do not respond to year-to-year fluctuations in a given measure of school quality. These studies suggest that the provision and framing of public information about school quality can influence residential choice (implying an effect on school choice), but this influence is conditioned by the character of the information that is already in the public domain.
Real estate price studies can only provide indirect evidence about school choice decisions, do not capture the effects of information on parents' decisions to enroll their children at non-guaranteed schools, and reveal little about the characteristics of the families whose decisions are affected. Mizala and Urquiola (2008) take a more direct and comprehensive approach, examining the effects of Chile's highly-publicized SNED awards on school enrollment levels, tuition fees, and school socioeconomic composition. They show that receiving an award had no effect on these outcomes in an environment where measures of school achievement were already widely available.
A related literature finds that providing information about school quality directly to a select group of parents, rather than to the general public, increases the probability that they choose higher-achieving schools (Hastings et al. 2007; Hastings and Weinstein 2008) . However, public information may have different effects than targeted information strategies: parents may be more likely to act on school quality information when they receive it directly from schools; and newly informed parents, especially those of disadvantaged children, may face less competition for spaces in preferred schools when they are part of a targeted group.
Publicly provided information in the form of "report cards" or rankings like those examined here have been shown to affect consumer decisions in other markets. These markets include health services (Dranove et al. 2003; Dafny and Dranove 2005; Jin and Sorensen 2006) and restaurant patronage (Jin and Leslie 2003) .
2
Institutional Background 2.1 School access and funding in B.C. School choice opportunities in B.C. are similar to many other jurisdictions. Students are guaranteed access to the neighborhood public school whose catchment area they reside in, or they may choose a non-guaranteed neighborhood school, a public magnet program, or a private school. Before 2003, access to a non-guaranteed neighborhood school required the permission of both the guaranteed school and the preferred school. B.C.'s provincial education authority (the Ministry of Education) instituted an official "open boundaries" policy in early 2003 that allows students to attend any public school in the province that has space available after catchment area students have enrolled. Rules for admission to oversubscribed schools are set by individual school districts, and typically prioritize siblings of current students, followed by other students within the district, and finally out-of-district students. Entry into most magnet programs is restricted to students entering Kindergarten or Grade 1, and space in popular programs is often allocated by lottery.
The B.C. Ministry of Education provides operating and capital funding directly to public school districts. Districts are not authorized to raise their own revenue. Operating funds are provided on the basis of total district enrolment. Supplementary funding is provided for each student who is Aboriginal, is gifted or disabled, or who qualifies for English as a Second Language (ESL) instruction. Private schools receive per-student operating grants of 35-50 percent of the base public school rate, and are responsible for teaching the provincial curriculum and meeting various provincial administrative requirements (B.C. Ministry of Education 2005).
2.2
Testing and information Since the 1999/2000 school year, all public and provincially-funded private schools have been required to administer standardized Foundation Skills Assessment (FSA) exams to students in Grades 4 and 7 in May of each year. Students are examined in Reading Comprehension, Writing, and Numeracy. The FSA exams do not contribute to students' academic records and play no role in grade completion, and there are no financial incentives for teachers or schools related to student performance. The Fraser Institute, an independent research and educational organization (Fraser Institute 2008) , began issuing annual "report cards" on B.C.'s elementary schools in June 2003 (Cowley and Easton 2003) . 4 These reports include school scores constructed by the Fraser Institute from FSA exam results, and rankings based on these scores.
5 From the outset, the Fraser Institute's school report cards have received widespread media coverage in the province's print, radio and television media. 6 3
Empirical methodology
School choice decisions are linked to decisions about residential location because of commuting costs and because access to some public schools is rationed through residential catchment areas.
For tractability and because of data limitations, we treat residential location as exogenous and examine inter-school mobility conditional on residential choice.
School choice
We assume that in each school year t, parents choose a single school for their child (we do not observe within-year school mobility) from a set of it S schools. 7 Suppose the parents of child i have preferences over schools represented by the expected utility function:
where z st is a vector of observable characteristics of school s in year t, ω st is a vector of school characteristics observed by parents but not the econometrician, q st is the parents' point estimate of school quality, x it is a vector of individual characteristics that influence preferences, and θ is a parameter vector.
At the completion of each grade, parents evaluate the expected utility of all schools in the choice set. A student currently attending school s′ will change schools if there is another school it S s ∈ that yields enough utility to compensate for the cost of changing schools, c ist . The probability 4 The authors are not affiliated with the Fraser Institute in any way. 5 The scores released in 2003 were based on school-average exam results in reading, writing and numeracy in Grades 4 and 7 (six mean scores, each given a weight of 13.3 percent), and the average gap between male and female scores on the Grade 7 reading and numeracy exams (each with a weight of 10 percent). The formula used to produce the scores released in 2004 placed a smaller weight on each of the school-average exam results (8.3 percent instead of 13.3 percent), placed the same weight on the gender gap in Grade 7 reading and numeracy scores (10 percent each) and included the percentage of students that did not "meet expectations" according to provincial standards, with a weight of 30 percent (see Cowley and Easton 2008:96 for details). 6 A ProQuest search of Vancouver's two most widely-read daily newspapers (the Vancouver Sun and the Province) returned twelve articles (including editorial content) published about the Fraser Institute's first elementary school report cards in June, 2003. 7 The set of available schools varies across students and time because access to some schools may be restricted to those living within the school's catchment area, principals sometimes exercise discretion over admission of out-ofcatchment area students, access to magnet programs may be rationed, access rules changed during our sample window, and because of school openings and closings. that student i separates from school s′ at the end of school year t and enrolls in a different school is therefore
To illustrate how new information about school quality affects school choice decisions, suppose parents' expected utility is linear in characteristics:
where γ it , α it , and π it are utility weights on school characteristics and expected school quality that may depend on parent and child characteristics, β is a vector of preference parameters, and u ist is a random component. New information about school-level achievement may change how parents weight different school characteristics when forming expectations of school quality.
8 Consider the introduction of a new measure of school-level achievement, such as a school report card based on the previous year's cohort, r st-1 . If we assume that parents' conditional expectation of school quality is based on a linear function, their point estimate of school quality before observing r st-1 is:
where δ 0 and η 0 are weights that parents apply to school characteristics. When parents receive new information about school-level achievement, they revise their beliefs about school quality via the updated conditional expectation:
where δ 1 and η 1 are the new weights applied to previously observed school characteristics, and 1 φ is the weight they place on the new information.
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Given the linear specification of expected utility in eq. (3), parents' expected utility before and after the introduction of the new measure of school-level achievement is: New information not only changes the weights applied to school characteristics in parents' utility, but also changes the weights applied to these characteristics in the probability that students change schools, via eq. (2). Similar revisions to these weights occur each time parents receive new signals of school quality.
Empirical specification
We focus on parents' decision to change the school at which their child is enrolled in response to new information about school-level achievement, taking their residential location and current school as given. 10 In keeping with our school choice framework, our regression model for the probability that student i separates from their school at the end of school year t depends on individual characteristics (x it ), measured and unmeasured school characteristics (z st and ω st , respectively), measures of school-level achievement observed by parents (r st-1 , based on previous student cohorts), and measures of the cost of changing schools (c ist ).
Our specification allows coefficients on school characteristics to vary across three information "regimes," because parents may change the weights applied to these characteristics when they acquire new information about school-level achievement. We specify a linear probability model for school separations:
where y it is a binary variable indicating whether student i separates from their school at the end of the school year, t n is an indicator for the first year in which a measure of school-level achievement is available to parents ("news"); + t n is an indicator for subsequent years in which the measure remains in the public domain ("old news"); η and λ are parameters to be estimated; and ε ist is a stochastic error term. We assume the following specification for unmeasured school characteristics:
10 An alternative approach suggested by our simple theoretical model would be to specify a probability distribution for u ist , e.g., an extreme value distribution, and model school choice in a random utility framework akin to McFadden (1978) or Berry et al. (1995) . Since school choice and residential location are likely to be jointly determined, and since we lack data on other determinants of residential choice (e.g., employment, home prices, and family structure), we do not take this approach.
where τ t is a fixed year effect; is ζ s a fixed school effect that captures the role of unobserved time-invariant school characteristics; and υ st is a random school-by-year effect that captures any additional unmeasured correlation among students' separation behavior in a given school and year.
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3.3 Identification School-level measures of the previous cohort's achievement are exogenous in the separation equation if there is no persistence in school-by-year level shocks that jointly affect achievement and separations (e.g. changes to a school's teacher complement). However, if these shocks are persistent, then previous cohorts' achievement will be correlated with unmeasured heterogeneity in separations in the current school year, υ st . Such persistence will bias the estimated effect of information about previous cohorts' performance on separations: φ and + φ will measure the response to information and the persistent effect of previous years' shocks.
We can eliminate this bias by controlling for the current cohort's measured achievement, r st , since this contains all relevant information about the persistent component of previous years' shocks. That is, previous cohorts' achievement is conditionally exogenous in the separation equation, given the current cohort's achievement, under the assumption that previous years' shocks are only correlated with υ st via their persistent effect on achievement. 
3.4
Data Our investigation focuses on B.C.'s Lower Mainland region, a large metropolitan area with a population of approximately 2.5 million that includes the city of Vancouver, its suburbs, and communities that are contiguous with them. It encompasses fourteen public school districts with a total annual enrollment of roughly 375,000 students in Kindergarten through Grade 12 (B.C. Ministry of Education 2007:8).
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Our student-level data are based on two administrative databases, integrated via a unique student identifier: an enrollment database (collected for each student on September 30 of each year), and 11 Stated differently, our reported standard errors account for clustering at the school-by-year level. 12 We can formalize the argument as follows. Suppose average achievement at school s in year t is a mean-zero function of observables, a school-specific component, a year-specific component, and a mean-zero school-by-year shock, χ st , that is uncorrelated with other inputs to achievement. That is, r st = r(z st , s, t) + χ st . Current-year achievement is endogenous in the separation equation if χ st is correlated with unmeasured heterogeneity in separations, υ st . We can represent this correlation by υ st = κχ st + ξ st where ξ st is a mean-zero component orthogonal to χ st . If the shocks are not persistent, so that E[χ st-1 χ st ] = 0, and the previous year's shock has no direct correlation with school-by-year heterogeneity in separations, so that E[χ st-1 ξ st ] = 0, then the previous cohort's achievement is exogenous in the separation equation because E[χ st-1 υ st ] = 0. Suppose to the contrary that shocks exhibit some persistence. We can represent this by χ st = ρχ st-1 + ς st where ς st has mean zero and is orthogonal to χ st-1 . Even if the previous year's shock has no direct correlation with current-year heterogeneity in separations (that is, E[χ st-1 ξ st ] = 0), the previous cohort's achievement is now endogenous in the separation equation: E[χ st-1 υ st ] = κρVar(χ st-1 ) ≠ 0 . However, conditional on the current cohort's achievement, if E[χ st-1 ξ st | χ st ] = 0 then the previous cohort's achievement is exogenous: E[χ st-1 υ st | χ st ] = 0. So our identifying assumption is that, conditional on the current cohort's achievement, previous years' shocks to achievement are only correlated with current-year unmeasured heterogeneity in separations via their persistent effect on achievement; that is, E[χ st-1 ξ st | χ st ] = 0. 13 The region is geographically isolated from other populated areas by the U.S. border to the south, the Strait of Georgia to the west, and rugged mountains to the north and east.
an FSA exam database. We augment these data with several external measures. First, we add school-by-grade average student characteristics. Second, we add selected characteristics of each student's neighborhood as measured in the Census of Population. Third, we add geographic coordinates associated with each school's postal code and each student's residential postal code and use them to calculate measures of distance between the student's home and various schools, and to create measures of the availability of school choice in the area surrounding the student's home. We also identify each student's guaranteed school based on their postal code. See the Data Appendix for details on how we construct these measures. Finally, we add the annual school scores and rankings that are produced and publicized by the Fraser Institute for each school year from 1999/2000 through 2003/04, and a three-year average score released in 2003.
3.5
Population under analysis and choice of explanatory variables Our analysis is based on an extract of the enrollment database that includes all students in the Lower Mainland who entered Grade 2 between 1996/1997 and 2001/2002. We restrict our sample to public school students who made regular progress through the grades (so that they entered Grades 3, 4, and 5 with their cohort) and remained in the Lower Mainland in Grades 2 through 5.
14 We restrict our attention to separation decisions at the end of the Grade 4 year in order to control for students' own performance on the FSA exam as well as the average performance of the student's same-school cohort. We create our indicator of separations, y it , by comparing the school at which the student was enrolled on September 30 of their Grade 4 year and the school at which they were enrolled on September 30 of their Grade 5 year.
Controls for individual characteristics include the student's own FSA exam scores in reading and numeracy, an indicator of whether the student previously separated from their school following Grades 2 and/or 3, and indicators for gender, Aboriginal identity, language spoken at home (Chinese, Punjabi, any other language besides English), disability, giftedness, and ESL status. We do not directly observe any socioeconomic characteristics of students' families. Therefore we include as proxies for unobserved student background characteristics a set of socioeconomic characteristics of the Census Enumeration or Dissemination Area (EA or DA, respectively) in which the student resides.
15 Controls for school characteristics include the proportion of Grade 4 students who are Aboriginal, speak Chinese at home, speak Punjabi at home, speak another nonEnglish language at home, have special needs (gifted or disabled), or are in an ESL program.
Our identification strategy requires that, conditional on a cohort's own achievement, unobserved factors that affect separations and vary over time within schools are not systematically related to lagged measures of school-level achievement. This condition may be violated if the open boundaries policy, introduced during the 2002/2003 school year, increased separations from lowachieving schools relative to high-achieving schools. To eliminate potential bias, all reported specifications include both the average Grade 4 FSA reading and numeracy exam results of the school's current Grade 4 cohort and the interaction between this variable and a binary variable that indicates whether the open boundaries policy was in effect.
We include several proxies for students' cost of changing schools. First, we include an indicator for attending a non-guaranteed public school, and for attending a French Immersion program (because this program is offered in a limited set of schools).
16 Second, we include the distance from the student's home to the school attended and to the guaranteed school.
17 Third, we control for the density of choice alternatives near the student's home: the number of public and private schools within the 75 th percentile of travel distance to public and private schools in our sample (1.06 km and 6.52 km, respectively).
18 Each measure of school-level achievement released during our sample window enters our regression model interacted with an indicator for the year in which it became available to parents ("news"), and interacted with an indicator for subsequent years that this information remained in the public domain ("old news"). The complete set of information shocks and the variables we use to capture them in our empirical model are summarized in Table 1 Of these, only the scores and rankings for 2001/2002 and the three-year averages were reported in the media. 20 We have no way to know (ex ante) how parents aggregated the various measures contained in the first Fraser Institute release. We control for the three-year average score and the score based on the 2001/2002 FSA exam, since these measures were published and were also the 16 French Immersion programs, which developed across Canada in the 1970's as part of a national effort to encourage bilingualism, are the most popular form of magnet programs in the Lower Mainland. They provide French-only instruction to non-francophone students from Kindergarten through Grade 5, when English language instruction is introduced in some subjects. 17 Both distance measures are based on reported postal codes. We exclude a small number of cases where the distance between a student's home and the school they attend exceeds 50 kilometers, since this probably reflects misreported postal codes. 18 Gibbons, Machin and Silva (2008) point out that measures of this kind are not ideal. However, they show that a number of alternative methods for defining measures of school choice availability produce qualitatively similar results. Likewise, our reported results are not sensitive to the inclusion of these measures, nor are they sensitive to alternate definitions of travel distance. 19 Our estimation sample includes only students who attended schools for which a full set of 
Results

4.1
Descriptive statistics Our estimation sample consists of 74,368 Grade 4 students. 22 We report sample means and mean separation rates for some key characteristics in Table 2 (sample means for all control variables are reported in Appendix Table A1 ). Five percent of students self-report as Aboriginal; these students have significantly higher separation rates than average (19.6% vs. 9.3%). Almost onethird of students speak a language at home other than English, and overall these students have a higher than average separation rate. However, non-English language students are a very diverse group. The two most common home language groups are "Chinese" (13.5 percent) and Punjabi (8.1 percent). The separation rate of Chinese students is below average (8.4%); the separation rate of Punjabi students is above average (10.1%). The remaining non-English language students have a substantially higher separation rate (13.5%).
Of the 362 public elementary schools in our sample, 356 are neighborhood (catchment area) schools and 6 are magnet schools that draw from a broad set of students within or across school districts.
23 Approximately 76 percent of students attend their guaranteed school. A further 6.5 percent of students attend a French Immersion program, and the remaining 17.5 percent of students attend a non-guaranteed neighborhood school. Students who attend their guaranteed school have below-average separation rates (8.7% vs. 9.3%), and the separation rates of French Immersion students are even lower (6.5%). Table 3 summarizes the joint distribution of school achievement measures that enter our baseline specification. Appendix Table A2 
Econometric estimates
We present our baseline estimates of the effect of information on school separations in Table 4 . Our baseline model includes school-average FSA exam results based on the average of the 21 To assess the robustness of this assumption, we also report results that control for the three-year average ranking and 2001/2002 ranking. In additional robustness checks (not reported) we control for all three scores and rankings and obtain results very similar to those reported here, although we lose some precision due to the high correlation between the scores/rankings in the three years (see Appendix Table A2 ). 22 Students with missing data are excluded. See the Data Appendix for information about the nature and frequency of missing data. 23 Magnet programs are often housed within schools that also serve catchment areas; we define magnet schools as schools that house magnet programs only. reading and numeracy mean scores, and Fraser Institute scores. The model includes fixed school effects, so that identification is based on how different cohorts of students in the same school respond to different information about previous cohorts' performance, conditional on characteristics and their own cohort's performance. Appendix Table A3 reports the estimated coefficients on all control variables.
We begin by discussing estimates in the first column of Table 4 . There is no evidence of any systematic overall response to publicly-released FSA exam scores. Coefficient estimates for the first two releases of FSA scores are negative, indicating that students' separation probability declined at public schools that received better news (higher school-average exam results), relative to public schools where the news was worse. However, only the second release is (marginally) statistically significant. Estimated coefficients on the Fraser Institute scores indicate a similar pattern of response. However, these coefficients are difficult to interpret given the high degree of collinearity between the Fraser Institute scores and FSA results released in the same year.
Thus we prefer the estimates in column 2, where we restrict the specification to a single information measure in each year: FSA exam scores in the first two years (when these were the only information measures available) and Fraser Institute scores in the latter two years (since these were published in the media, and therefore more salient). The pattern of parents' response to information is now clearer, but remains weak. In each case, coefficient estimates are negative, indicating that students' separation probability declined at schools where the news was better; and symmetrically, that separations increased at schools where the news was worse. Only the response to the second release of FSA scores and the second release of Fraser Institute scores is statistically significant, however. None of the information shocks had any effect beyond their immediate impact in the year in which they were released: the estimated "old news" effects are all statistically insignificant, and the point estimates are small. Coefficients on the current-year mean FSA score are small and statistically insignificant, indicating there is no systematic relationship between current-year achievement and separations. Thus we are confident that our "news" measures capture parents' response to information, and not unobserved heterogeneity that jointly affects achievement and mobility.
However, estimates in column 2 mask considerable heterogeneity in parents' response to information. In columns 3 and 4, we divide the sample into students who report speaking English at home, and those who report speaking another language. Language barriers may increase some parents' cost of accessing information. Moreover, home language may act as a proxy for preferences or cultural norms. We find that parents of children who speak English at home responded strongly to first two releases of FSA exam scores. In each case, the magnitude of the point estimate implies that when a school scored one standard deviation higher in the distribution of school-average FSA scores, students' separation probability declined by slightly more than one percentage point. On a base separation rate of about 9% per year, this is quite a large response. However, these parents did not respond to subsequent information releases by the Fraser Institute, indicating they had already absorbed the available information about school achievement.
In contrast, parents of children who report speaking a language other than English at home did not respond to the release of FSA scores, but did respond strongly to the second release of Fraser Institute scores. The point estimate implies that a one standard deviation increase in the Fraser Institute score relative to other schools reduced these students' separation probability by 2.4 percentage points. Such a large response suggests poor access to previously released information, rather than resources, preferences, or opportunities, explains these parents' delayed response to information about school-level achievement.
In columns 5 and 6, we break out the two largest groups of students who report speaking a language other than English at home. The pattern of response is similar. Chinese-speaking parents do not respond to either release of FSA scores, but respond strongly to both releases by the Fraser Institute. Here, the point estimates are large and precisely estimated: a one standard deviation increase in news about a school's first Fraser Institute report card reduced the probability of separation by 3.6 percentage points, and by 4.7 percentage points for the second release. This is an enormous response considering that the mean separation rate among these students was only 8.4%. Punjabi-speaking parents respond only to the second Fraser Institute report card, but again the magnitude is large: a one standard deviation increase in the Fraser Institute score reduced these students' separation probability by 2.7 percentage points.
A concern is that we may not be measuring heterogeneity in responses due to language barriers, but rather heterogeneity driven by correlates of language such as income. Parents who live in disadvantaged communities may have relatively poor access to information or school choice opportunities. In Table 5 , we reproduce estimates for all students, English-speakers, and nonEnglish-speakers, broken out by neighborhood income. Specifically, we break out families who reside in Census EA/DAs in the top (richest) and bottom quartiles of the distribution of average household income. Overall, parents who live in bottom quartile neighborhoods are substantially more responsive to new information than parents in top quartile neighborhoods (columns 1 and 2). The same is true among English-speakers (columns 3 and 4). The relatively strong response among parents who reside in low-income neighborhoods suggests that many are interested in enrolling their children in high-quality schools and have the means to do so, but have relatively poor access to private information about school quality. Their very strong response to the first release of public information indicates it contained substantial news for these parents, leading them to update their beliefs about school quality and respond substantively. Among non-Englishspeakers, in contrast, there is no apparent difference in response across neighborhood income quartiles (columns 5 and 6). This reinforces our conclusion that language barriers are the underlying cause of these parents' delayed response to information about school-level achievement. Overall, it seems clear that access to information, rather than school choice opportunities or financial resources, is the essential factor determining how parents respond. Table 6 explores the sensitivity of our results to sample composition and specification. The first column presents our baseline estimates for English-language parents, reproduced from the third column of Table 4 . Results in the second and third columns of Table 4 show that Englishlanguage parents' response to the first information shock is not driven by Aboriginal parents or parents of French Immersion students. Both of these groups had unconditional separation rates significantly different from the average student (see Table 2 ). The response to the second information shock is right on the threshold of statistical significance at the 10% level in our baseline results; excluding either aboriginal students or French Immersion students changes point estimates only slightly, but enough to move the p-value over the 10% threshold. Results for the Fraser Institute scores are unchanged.
Robustness
The second panel of Table 6 presents results when we include information measures based on the Fraser Institute school rankings instead of the Fraser Institute school scores out of ten, for each of our home language groups. 24 The response of English language parents to the second release of FSA scores is no longer statistically significant. The sign of the response of Punjabi language parents to the second Fraser Institute remains unchanged, but the coefficient is no longer statistically significant. 25 We also examine whether our estimates for separate quartiles of the distribution of neighborhood income and home language group are sensitive to including the Fraser Institute rankings instead of scores. These estimates are in Table 7 . Only one result is sensitive to which Fraser Institute measure is used: the effect of the first Fraser Institute release on English language parents in the bottom quartile is statistically significant at the 10% level when we include the Fraser Institute scores (see Table 5 ), but is statistically insignificant when we include the Fraser Institute ranking.
Conclusion
We find that the public release of information about school-level achievement had a large effect on the inter-school mobility of some Grade 4 students attending public schools in the Lower Mainland region of B.C. A substantial proportion of parents appear to revise their beliefs about the relative quality of their child's school in response to this information, and "vote with their feet" by moving their child to a preferred school. This response is particularly large among English-language parents who reside in low-income neighborhoods, and occurs the first time that school-level achievement measures are placed in the public domain. Non-English language parents in both high-and low-income neighborhoods also respond strongly to public information about school quality. However, these parents appear to face higher costs of accessing school quality information disseminated through public media. Chinese language parents, in particular, respond strongly to school quality information only when the media provided widespread coverage to the Fraser Institute's school report cards. These results suggest that high-profile 24 Coefficient estimates for the rankings and school scores have opposing signs, because a smaller rank indicates better performance (the top-ranked school is ranked 1). 25 In separate results not reported in this paper, we investigate the robustness of our results for English and nonEnglish language parents to alternate information measures based on FSA exam results. We find that including school mean results based on both reading and numeracy scores, instead of their average, or including either one but not the other, leaves the estimated response to the Fraser Institute scores virtually unchanged. When the numeracy score is include alone, the effect of the second information shock on separations of English language students is not statistically significant. All other results are similar to those reported. dissemination can play a crucial role in ensuring access to publicly-provided information in environments with culturally and linguistically diverse populations.
Jurisdictions that publicize school-level results typically update this information annually, raising concerns that parents may respond to year-to-year fluctuations that are largely noise (Kane and Staiger 2002; Mizala, Romaguera and Urquiola 2007). Our results mitigate these concerns. English-speaking parents absorb information quickly. Subsequent releases, even when the information is reframed, do not generate an additional response. The delayed response of other language groups suggests that annual releases of school quality information that elicit ongoing media coverage may play an important role in communicating that information to all segments of the community, including recent immigrants.
These results add to a growing body of evidence that information about school-level achievement affects behavior in ways that may have real consequences for educational outcomes. In addition to ensuring that all parents are able to access the information provided, educational authorities should therefore take care to ensure that widely disseminated information brings competitive pressure to bear on schools that are ineffective, rather than on schools that serve disadvantaged populations. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the school-by-year level. *** indicates statistically significant at the 1% level, ** indicates significant at the 5% level, * indicates significant at the 10% level. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the school-by-year level. *** indicates statistically significant at the 1% level, ** indicates significant at the 5% level, * indicates significant at the 10% level. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the school-by-year level. *** indicates statistically significant at the 1% level, ** indicates significant at the 5% level, * indicates significant at the 10% level. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the school-by-year level. *** indicates statistically significant at the 1% level, ** indicates significant at the 5% level, * indicates significant at the 10% level.
Appendix A: Control Variables. Source: Authors' calculations based on B.C. Ministry of Education enrollment and FSA exam databases. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the school-by-year level. *** indicates statistically significant at the 1% level, ** indicates significant at the 5% level, * indicates significant at the 10% level.
Discussion of Table A3
The probability of separation is higher for gifted students, disabled students, and lower achieving students, varies by home language, and is strikingly higher among Aboriginal students. Separation rates are lower among students who attend their guaranteed school or a French Immersion program. Distance to school has a significant effect on separations, but the magnitude is small. Unsurprisingly, prior mobility is a strong predictor of current separation. 
Data Appendix Coding of Catchment Area Boundaries
We contacted all fourteen Lower Mainland school districts to obtain information on the catchment area boundaries of public elementary schools. Most districts provided us with a map that explicitly delineated the boundaries. Some districts provided us with written descriptions of the boundaries (e.g., School X's catchment area is bounded to the east by East Ravine, to the north by North Road, etc.) in cases where such descriptions are used to administer enrollment eligibility. We used the information provided to us by districts to create a digital map of catchment area boundaries, overlaid on a street map of the Lower Mainland, using GIS software (ArcInfo). We then overlaid our digital boundary map with a map of Lower Mainland postal codes. Using the latitude and longitude of the population-weighted centroid of each postal code, we assigned a unique catchment area school to each postal code. We then integrated the unique ID of each postal code's catchment area school with the enrollment database via students' residential postal code on September 30 of each year.
In a small number of cases (about 3.3 percent of all Grade 4 students) we were unable to determine a student's catchment area school. These cases arose when a student's residential postal code was invalid or outside the Lower Mainland (the most likely cause being a misreported postal code), or when we were unable to assign a catchment area school to a valid Lower Mainland postal code. This was the case when we knew that catchment area boundaries were redrawn due to school openings and/or closings, but we were unable to obtain reliable information about historical catchment area boundaries. As described below, students for whom we were unable to determine their catchment area school are excluded from our analysis.
Coding of Neighborhood Characteristics
Neighborhood characteristics are based on public-use aggregates of the Census of Population "long form," administered by Statistics Canada to one in five households in 1996 and 2001. The lowest level of geography for which Statistics Canada produced aggregate statistics based on the 1996 Census is an Enumeration Area (EA). Statistics based on the 2001 Census were produced at the Dissemination Area (DA) level. EAs are geographic areas designated for the collection of Census data. Prior to the 2001 Census, EAs were used for both Census data collection and dissemination. In the 2001 Census, they were replaced by DAs for dissemination purposes. In the 1996 Census, EAs were composed of one or more neighboring blocks containing between 125 and 440 dwellings (in rural and urban areas, respectively). In the 2001 Census, DAs were composed of one or more neighboring blocks with a population of 400 to 700 persons. These definitions are sufficiently similar for our purposes.
EA/DA-level Census characteristics were integrated with our enrollment data via students' residential postal code in each year. The integrated EA/DA characteristics are based on the most recently administered Census for each year of our sample. We link postal codes and EAs/DAs In a small number of cases, we were unable to assign EA/DA-level characteristics to residential postal codes. This arose when residential postal codes did not appear in the PCCF (most likely due to mis-reported postal codes), or when EA/DA-level characteristics were suppressed by Statistics Canada for confidentiality reasons. Overall, these cases comprised about 1 percent of grade 4 students in the enrollment database.
Coding of Distance and School Density Measures
Our measures of the distance between students' residence, the school they attended, and their catchment area school are based on reported postal codes. We obtained postal codes for all schools attended by grade 4 students who met our other sample restrictions from public sources (most notably, school and district websites). We used the PCCF to assign a latitude and longitude to each postal code in each year, and calculated the great circle distance (in km) between the student's residence and schools. For each residential postal code in each year, we then calculated the number of active public and private schools within a circle centered on the residential postal code and with radius equal to the 75 th percentile of in-sample travel distance to public and private schools, respectively.
Coding of Other Key Variables
Students were coded as speaking Chinese, Punjabi, or another non-English language at home if they ever reported speaking that home language in our extract of the enrollment database. In all regressions, the reference category for home language is students who always report speaking English at home. Similarly, students are coded as Aboriginal, disabled, or gifted if they ever report that status. Students are coded as ESL if they are designated as such in the current school year. School-by-grade averages of these variables were provided to us by Edudata Canada. In constructing our measure of prior mobility, we suppressed a small number of "normal" school changes between annexes (schools that offer up to Grade 2 or 3 only) and regular elementary or middle schools on the same property.
Missing Data and Other Sample Restrictions
As reported in the main text, we restrict our analysis sample to students who entered Grade 2 at a Lower Mainland school between 1997/1998 and 2001/2002 , subsequently made regular progress through Grades 3, 4, and 5 at Lower Mainland schools, and were enrolled in Grade 4 at a public school between 1999/2000 and 2003/2004 . We excluded 1,392 observations where a student did not progress through the grades along with her cohort, and we excluded 479 observations where the measured distance between the student's residence and the school they attended exceeded 50km (since it is likely that this distance indicates measurement error in the postal code). Our sample comprises 103,777 Grade 4 students after applying these sample restrictions. Of these, Additional Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the school-by-year level. *** indicates statistically significant at the 1% level, ** indicates significant at the 5% level, * indicates significant at the 10% level.
